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Abstract
The notion of incrementalism, formulated by Aaron Wildavsky in the 1960s,
has been extremely influential in the public budgeting literature. In essence, it
entails the claim that legislators engaged in budgetary policymaking accept past
allocations, and decide only on the allocation of increments to revenue. Wildavsky
explained incrementalism with reference to the cognitive limitations of lawmakers
and their desire to reduce conflict. This paper uses a legislative bargaining framework to undertake a formal analysis of incremental budgeting. An exogenously
chosen agenda setter proposes budgets and seeks to build coalitions to secure passage, over multiple periods. The central result is that the agenda setter can lower
her cost of building a winning coalition, and thereby raise her payoff, by following an incrementalist strategy, which involves maintaining the same coalition
every period. First, it is shown within a simple 2-period model that there exist
subgame perfect incremental budgeting equilibria of this nature. If the agenda
setter is assumed to be able to commit to the grandfathering of past allocations,
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (up to the choice of the coalition members) involves incremental budgeting. The model is then extended to an infinitely
repeated setting, and it is shown that the agenda setters incentives for incremental budgeting are reinforced in this context. Some testable implications (relating
incrementalism to various characteristics of the legislature) are also derived. Finally, the implications for incrementalism of heterogeneity among legislators are
analyzed.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D72, H61
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1) Introduction
Ever since it was proposed by Aaron Wildavsky (e.g. 1984; 1988) in the 1960’s,
‘incrementalism’ has proven to be an extremely influential theory within the field of public
budgeting.1 Incrementalism is defined as “a process in which budgetary bases (i.e. previous
expenditures) are accepted . . . [and] budgeting is a stable process . . .” (Gist, 1982, p. 859). This
theoretical framework encompasses a descriptive claim as well as a normative one. The former
involves the contention that Congress and other legislatures follow an incrementalist mode of
budgetary decisionmaking (or, at least, that they did so during the period in which Wildavsky
developed the theory). The latter claim rests on Wildavsky’s (1984, p. 136) argument that
incremental budgeting is superior to feasible alternatives because of the cognitive limitations of
lawmakers, and because it can attenuate political conflict over budgeting priorities. Although the
theory has declined in salience in the United States since the 1980’s due to various changes in
the budgetary environment,2 it remains an important account of ‘classical’ or ‘traditional’
budgeting in the public budgeting literature.
While there have been extensive conceptual discussions and empirical studies of this
topic, little attempt has previously been made to examine the implications of formal gametheoretic models of legislative institutions for the analysis of incremental budgeting. The aim of
this paper is to develop such an analysis, using a modified version of the legislative bargaining
framework of Baron and Ferejohn (1989).3 The model assumes a legislature with an exogonously
given agenda setter, who has the power to propose budget allocations over multiple periods. In
order to secure passage of the budget each period, the agenda setter must attract the support of a
given number of the other (‘junior’) legislators. She obtains their votes by allocating funds for
their districts in the budget proposal. The requirement that the budget must be passed, and the
available revenue, constrain the agenda setter in seeking to maximize the budgetary allocation
for her own district.
1

According to Berry (1990, p. 167): “No single concept has been more central to the study of public budgeting over
the last three decades.”
2
Among the most important of these changes was that the budgetary increments of the past were transformed into
decrements - both due to the deficits of the 1980's, and to the growth of entitlement spending, which reduced the
revenue available for discretionary allocation. Thus, Garrett (1998, p. 392, note 14) notes that incrementalism was
“easier to maintain when federal budgets seemed to be continually increasing”, while “[t]he salience of the budget
deficit and the disappearance of the increment . . . undermined the theory.”
3
Recent examples of the use of such a model to analyze issues in public finance include Leblanc, Snyder and
Tripathi (1999) and Dharmapala (1999). See also Knight (2002) for an empirical perspective.
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This paper uses a specific conceptualization of the notion of incrementalism. An
incremental budgeting process is defined as one characterized by ‘coalitional stability’ (the
maintenance by the agenda setter of the same coalition every period), where the budget
allocations of members of this stable coalition are nondecreasing.4 The basic intuition for the
results of this paper is that, by instituting incremental budgeting practices, the agenda setter can
lower the cost of building a winning coalition to pass the budget, and thereby raise her payoff. In
particular, under incremental budgeting, the junior legislators who are included in the stable
coalition are willing to accept (and vote for) lower budget allocations each period than under
alternative nonincremental procedures, in exchange for the certainty of being included in future
coalitions. Thus, incremental budgeting lowers the cost (in terms of allocations to other
legislators’ districts) that the agenda setter incurs to secure passage of the budget, and leaves
more of the budget available for allocation to her own district.
Section 3 develops a simple 2-period budgeting game of the kind described above. It is
shown that there exist subgame perfect ‘incremental budgeting’ equilibria (in which the agenda
setter maintains the same coalition in period 2 as in period 1, and the members of this coalition
vote for period 1 allocations that are lower than their default payoffs). However, there also exist
other (‘nonincremental’) equilibria, where the agenda setter’s payoff is lower (and the payoffs of
the other legislators are higher) than in the incremental equilibria. Then, it is assumed that the
agenda setter can credibly precommit to ‘grandfathering’ past budget allocations, for example,
through the choice of institutional features of budgetary decisionmaking, such as budget
baselines or procedural rules that preclude (or impose high transactions costs on) revisiting past
allocations.5 In such circumstances, the only subgame perfect equilibrium (unique up to the
choice of the coalition members) involves incremental budgeting.
In Section 4, it is shown that the agenda setter’s incentives for incremental budgeting are
reinforced in an infinite horizon context. Moreover, numerical simulations for reasonable values
of the model’s parameters suggest that the magnitude of the increase in the agenda setter’s perperiod payoff is substantial. Section 5 introduces heterogeneity among the junior legislators in
the default payoffs they receive if the agenda setter’s proposal is defeated. The result is that, if
4

Clearly, this formulation fails to capture all of the myriad ways that the term ‘incrementalism’ has been used in the
public budgeting literature; however, it is sufficiently precise to serve as a starting point for formal analysis.
5
For an empirical analysis of the consequences of budget baselines for fiscal policy, see Crain and Crain (1998).
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the differences in the default payoffs are sufficiently small, then, an agenda setter who can
credibly precommit to grandfathering can increase her payoff by using incremental budgeting.
These results imply that budget proposers may have an incentive to institute incremental
budgeting practices in order to lower their costs of passing the budget, thereby increasing the
revenue available for their own preferred spending priorities. This explanation for
incrementalism contrasts with Wildavsky’s emphasis on cognitive limitations and the desire to
reduce conflict. The model also yields some testable predictions linking this incentive for
incremental budgeting to factors such as the size of the legislature, supermajority requirements,
and the discount rate.
Following this introduction, Section 2 elaborates further on the idea of incrementalism.
The basic 2-period model is presented in Section 3, and Section 4 develops the infinitely
repeated version of the model. The extension to heterogeneous legislators is presented in Section
5. Section 6 concludes the paper, and discusses some further possible extensions.
2) The Notion of Incremental Budgeting
The notion of incremental budgeting is closely associated with Aaron Wildavsky's
characterization of ‘classical budgeting’. While there are many different definitions of
incrementalism (see e.g. Berry (1990)), the basic feature is that budgetary allocations are
relatively stable over time. The allocation received by a particular area for one year forms the
basis of its allocation for the next, and decisionmaking focuses on increments to revenue. Thus,
Wildavsky (1984, p. xii) characterizes incrementalism as a process “where changes are small,
alternatives resemble those of the past, and patterns of relationships among participants remain
stable.”
Wildavsky’s formulation, as developed in his classic 1964 book, The Politics of the
Budgetary Process, and in his subsequent writings, has both positive and normative components.
The positive, or descriptive, aspect of his theory is summarized as follows: “The largest
determining factor of this year’s budget is last year’s. Most of each budget is a product of
previous decisions . . . many items are standard, simply reenacted every year” (1988, p. 78).
Moreover, “[a]t any one time, after past commitments are paid for, a rather small percentage -
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seldom larger than 30 percent, often smaller than 5 - is within the realm of anybody's . . .
discretion as a practical matter” (1988, p. 78).6
The major alternatives to budgetary incrementalism that have been proposed by scholars
of public budgeting are ‘zero-based budgeting’ (ZBB) and ‘planning, programming, and
budgeting systems’ (PPBS), also known as ‘program budgeting’. The former involves
reconsidering budgetary allocations in their entirety each year, using a zero base for each
program. The latter involves focusing on the goals and objectives of budgetary expenditures (i.e.
the outputs of government programs) and comparing different expenditure packages in terms of
their success in producing these outputs.
The normative aspect of Wildavsky’s theory entails the claim that incremental budgeting
is superior to these ‘comprehensive’ approaches; two main reasons are offered. One is that
incrementalism “increases agreement among the participants” (1984, p. 136), and can thus
promote consensus (or at least suppress conflict) among budgetary policymakers. The other is
that incrementalism reduces the “burden of calculation” (1984, p. 136) and imposes fewer
demands on legislators’ cognitive capacities.7 In this vein, he argues that: “Clinging to last year's
agreements is enormously economical of critical resources . . . which would be seriously
depleted if all or most past agreements were reexamined yearly.” (1984, p. 217).
Thus, Wildavsky's explanation for why legislators may favor an incremental approach to
budgeting relies primarily on their information-processing limitations, as well as on their desire
to avoid conflict. These motivational assumptions are quite distinct from those that are
highlighted in the rational choice literature (notably, the desire to maximize the probability of
reelection and to obtain redistributive transfers). Indeed, the issue of incremental budgeting has
attracted little analysis from a rational choice perspective. In particular, while there has been
some recent literature on the impact of interest group lobbying on incremental budgetary
outcomes (Tohamy, Aranson and Dezhbaksh, 1999; 2000),8 no previous attempt has been made
6

Wildavsky (1984, p. 14) examines appropriations for a sample of 37 agencies, and shows that the variation for the
majority was less than 10% per year. See also Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1966) and Kamlet and Mowery
(1987) for further evidence. However, Gist (1982) finds a contrary result.
7
This idea could perhaps also be formulated in terms of the transaction costs of reaching a budgetary agreement.
8
Tohamy et al. (1999; 2000) develop an interest group approach, in which a single legislator (who is assumed to
have unilateral control of budgetary policy) is lobbied by interest groups seeking budget allocations. The legislator
can choose between ‘single-period budgeting’, allocating funds for one period only, or ‘multi-period budgeting’,
allocating funding in perpetuity; the latter tends to lead to incremental outcomes. Interest groups are generally
willing to pay more (in campaign contributions) for a stream of future benefits, so the legislator trades off these
higher contributions against the loss of flexibility entailed by incrementalism. The legislator’s optimal policy
4

to analyze incrementalism from the perspective of formal game-theoretic models of legislative
institutions.
3) The Basic Model
3.1) Assumptions
This section presents a simple model that illustrates the main themes of the paper. The
model assumes a legislature with an odd number n of members. The legislature is denoted as the
set L (so that card (L) = n). It is assumed that the legislature operates under a rule requiring
(q + 1) votes (out of n) for the passage of legislation, where q < (n – 1) (i.e. the legislature does
not have a requirement of unanimity). The task faced by the legislature is to enact a budget
(allocating funds to each of n areas) for each of two periods. The revenue available in each
period is assumed to be exogenously fixed, and denoted by R in period 1, and (R + I) in period 2,
where I ≥ 0 is the incremental revenue gained in period 2.9 The (common) discount factor is
given by δ ∈ (0, 1]. Time periods are indexed by i, and the legislators by j. The budget enacted in
period i is denoted bLi. Legislator j’s payoff in period i is simply the allocation bjLi, the amount
that the enacted budget allocates to the j’th budgetary function. Thus, legislator j’s aggregate
payoff is (bjL1 + δbjL2). Note that the formulation here entails that the legislators are risk-neutral;
generally speaking, the results below would only be reinforced if legislators were risk-averse. A
natural interpretation of the model is as one of distributive politics, with the j’th element of the
budget vector bLi representing the level of spending in legislator j’s district (electoral
considerations are not explicitly modeled here; however, it is implicit in this interpretation that
securing spending for one's district increases the probability of reelection).
In the standard legislative bargaining framework of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), nature
randomly chooses a proposer from among the legislators. However, the analysis in this paper
focuses on the behavior of a given agenda setter over multiple periods. Thus, it is assumed that
an exogenously chosen legislator, denoted A, is the agenda setter for each of the two periods.
Without loss of generality, A is numbered legislator j = 1; the other legislators (j = 2, . . . , n) will
be described as ‘junior’ legislators, and are collectively denoted as the set J (where {A} ∪ J = L).
depends on a variety of economic conditions. The authors also develop a new procedure for empirically testing for
incremental outcomes.
9
The restriction that the increments to revenue are nonnegative is not required in the infinitely repeated game of
Section 4, as long as a convergence requirement is satisfied.
5

Exclusive proposal power is vested in A, and her proposals are voted on under a closed rule (with
no amendments being permitted).10 Thus, within each period, A proposes a budget allocation (A’s
proposals in the two periods are denoted by bPi (i = 1, 2)), and then the legislature votes on it. If
it is passed, the proposal is implemented; if it is not passed, then an exogenous default budget
allocation is implemented. The default allocation (or reversion point) in period i is denoted by
bDi (i =1, 2). Initially, it will be assumed that the (n – 1) junior legislators are ex ante identical,11
so that each of them receives b0Di if A’s proposal is defeated in period i, while A receives bADi;
thus, bDi = (bADi, b0Di . . . , b0Di). Note that the (exogonous) revenue in each period must be
sufficient to at least cover the default budget - thus, it is assumed that:12

and

R ≥ (n – 1)b0D1 + bAD1

(1a)

R + I ≥ (n – 1)b0D2 + bAD2

(1b)

It is assumed that A’s proposals must satisfy a period-by-period budget constraint; however,
permitting an intertemporal budget constraint would not substantially affect the results.13
The most straightforward interpretation of the default payoffs is as the consumption
levels that are implemented when agreement is not reached within the legislature. This is similar
to the model of Leblanc et al. (1999), where there are multiple periods of legislative bargaining,
and a known, finite number of rounds of proposals within each period. If no proposal has passed
by the end of the last round, the default is implemented for that period. It is possible to interpret
the model of this paper in the same spirit as that of Leblanc et al. (1999), with the number of
rounds within each period being set to 1. This interpretation is illustrated by Figure 1.
[Fig. 1 about here]
Alternatively, it is possible to motivate the default payoffs as follows (in a manner closer
to the original Baron-Ferejohn (1989) formulation). Suppose that, within each period, A makes
10

These institutional features are intended to reflect the Congressional budgeting context upon which Wildavsky
based his theories, with A playing a role analogous to the Appropriations Committee (the assumption of a closed rule
need not necessarily entail a formal rule to this effect, but may reflect A’s agenda setting and procedural advantages,
even when an open rule nominally applies). However, the assumptions are capable of being interpreted more
broadly; for instance, A could be viewed as the cabinet in a parliamentary system. For models of coalition-building
in parliamentary systems, see Baron (1998) and Diermeier and Merlo (2000).
11
The impact of legislator heterogeneity is analyzed in Section 5.
12
The budget constraint, of course, includes the special case where the default allocation exactly exhausts the
budget. The formulation in the text also allows for the possibility that the default budget is smaller in size than the
available revenue. Obviously, the results below all hold for the special case as well.
13
Essentially, the equilibria derived below are unchanged, except that, as A discounts future payoffs, she may
borrow in period 1 and thereby increase her equilibrium payoff. This would not, however, affect the comparison
between incremental and nonincremental budgeting.
6

the first proposal. If it passes, it is implemented; otherwise, A loses the floor, and a junior
legislator is randomly chosen to propose a budget allocation. If this proposal passes, it is
implemented; otherwise, another junior legislator is randomly chosen to make a proposal, and so
on (the number of rounds within a period is thus potentially infinite). Then, b0Di is the expected
continuation value of the game in period i to each j∈J, if A’s proposal is rejected. A number of
points concerning this interpretation are worth noting. Firstly, since the j’s are ex ante identical,
and given that they face identical recognition probabilities if A’s proposal is rejected, b0Di should
be the same for all j. Secondly, suppose that A’s proposal in period 1, bP1, is voted down, so that
oe of the j’s is chosen as proposer. In equilibrium, this j can be expected to treat A
asymmetrically with respect to the other j’s in choosing a coalition, because A will have proposal
power (with probability 1) in round 1 of period 2. That is, equilibrium play in the game in period
1 will involve anticipating what will happen in period 2; hence, bAD1 will, in general differ from
b0D1. Finally, if A’s proposal in period 2, bP2, fails, a randomly chosen j will propose without
considering the ‘shadow of the future’; thus, the default payoffs may differ across periods.
While the discussion above suggests that the default payoffs may differ across periods, it
turns out that imposing the restriction that
A1: b0D1 = b0D2 = b0D > 0 ∀j∈J
greatly simplifies the notation and algebra, without fundamentally affecting the results; thus, this
restriction will be imposed below. A more significant assumption in this model is that the default
payoffs are exogenous, in the sense of being independent of the realized play of the game. In
particular, this rules out the case where bjD2 = bjL1 (i.e. where legislator j’s period 2 default is
simply her period 1 allocation). While this may seem to be a significant restriction, it is argued in
Section 3.6 below that, as long as A can commit to grandfathering (in a sense made more precise
in Section 3.4 below), then this is not so restrictive, in the sense that ‘incremental’ outcomes can
still occur with endogenous period 2 defaults.14
Before proceeding to solve the model, it is helpful to derive two preliminary results that
apply to any Nash equilibrium of the budgeting game described above. The first is closely
analogous to a result in Leblanc et al. (1999, p. 35):
Lemma 1: In any Nash equilibrium, legislators resolve indifference by voting for (rather than
against) a proposed budget.
14

Restricting the default payoffs to be exogenous in this sense also addresses the problem that the default payoffs
may not satisfy the budget constraint if they are endogenous.
7

Proof: Suppose that legislator j∈J is indifferent between voting ‘yes’ and ‘no’ for some
proposed allocation that involves bjP1 = x. Now suppose that j resolves indifference by
voting ‘no’; then, A can induce j to vote ‘yes’ by setting bjP1 = x + ε (for small ε > 0).
However, this cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium, as ∃ some ε′ ∈ (0, ε) for which j will
also vote ‘yes’, and for which A will enjoy a strictly larger payoff. Thus, in any Nash
equilibrium, j must resolve indifference by voting ‘yes’. End of Proof.
Note also that it is assumed that A always votes for her own proposal. The second result is:
Lemma 2: In any Nash equilibrium, A’s proposal always passes.
Proof: Consider period 1:
R ≥ (n – 1)b0D + bAD1 by assumption (Equation 1a, and A1)
⇒ bAD1 ≤ R – (n – 1)b0D
To ensure passage, it is sufficient for A to offer b0D to q j’s; i.e. A can obtain a payoff of
at least (R – qb0D) by proposing a budget that passes. As q < (n – 1) (by assumption), this
payoff is strictly greater than bAD1. A similar argument can be made for period 2. Thus,
there is no Nash equilibrium in which A’s proposal fails to pass. End of Proof.
These two preliminary results are used repeatedly below.
3.2) Solution without Commitment
This section presents and solves a 2-period model, in which the basic game depicted in
Figure 1 is played once, and then repeated once. Before proceeding, however, it is helpful to
briefly consider the 1-period model, where the game in Figure 1 is played once (without
repetition). A’s strategy is simply a proposal bP1, while each j’s strategy maps A’s proposal bjP1
into an action from the set {yes, no} (i.e. into a vote for or against the proposed budget). The
relevant solution concept here (as in the later analysis) is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. It is
also generally assumed that the j’s behave symmetrically when placed in identical circumstances
(e.g. being offered the same allocation).
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the 1-period game involves A proposing the default
payoff b0D for exactly q junior legislators, and 0 for all others. The j’s in the coalition vote ‘yes’,
while the others vote ‘no’ (this outcome follows from the following strategies being mutual best
responses: A proposes b0D to exactly q junior legislators and 0 for all others, and each j votes
‘yes’ whenever bjP1 ≥ b0D and ‘no’ otherwise). This equilibrium is unique up to the choice of the
coalition of q j’s. Note that subgame perfection rules out certain Nash equilibria, such as those in
which each j demands strictly more than b0D to vote ‘yes’. Note also that A’s equilibrium payoff
(R – qb0D) is greater than the default payoff bAD1.
8

Now consider the 2-period game. In this section, it is assumed that A cannot make
binding commitments to other legislators in period 1 concerning budgetary proposals to be made
in period 2. Intuitively, the prevailing budgetary institutions are assumed to entail a zero base for
each area of spending. A’s strategies now involve 2 proposals, bP1 and bP2. However, eliminating
certain clearly dominated strategies (such as proposing strictly positive allocations to more than
q j’s, or proposing 0), it is readily apparent that the crucial element of A’s strategy is whether or
not it specifies that the same coalition will be chosen in period 2 as in period 1. Let the period-1
and period-2 coalitions be denoted by M1 and M2, respectively. Then, any strategy that involves
setting M2 = M1 (conditional on bP1 being enacted) will be termed an ‘incrementalist’ strategy
(denoted σAI). Note that it will be assumed as part of such a strategy that, if bP1 is defeated in
period 1, A chooses M2 randomly. This is always an optimal strategy in the remaining subgame
after a first-period defeat. Essentially, it entails that A cannot credibly threaten to punish those j’s
in M1 who vote ‘no’ in period 1 by, for instance, excluding them from M2 with probability 1.
Allowing A to play any (optimal) strategy following a first-period defeat, however, only
reinforces the basic results of this section (see Section 3.5 for a discussion).
Now consider j’s strategies. Note that subgame perfection entails that play in period 2
will always be essentially identical to the outcome of the 1-period game (discussed above): A
will propose b0D for exactly q j’s, and these j’s will vote ‘yes’. Thus, j’s optimal strategy in
period 2 will always involve voting ‘yes’ to a proposal allocating bjP2 ≥ b0D, and ‘no’ otherwise.
Taking this into account, and eliminating dominated strategies, j’s strategy in the 2-period game
can be characterized simply as the cut-point value of bjP1 at and above which j votes ‘yes’ in
period 1 (contingent, of course, on A’s strategy in period 2). To characterize this, consider
j ∈ M1, and suppose A is playing σAI (i.e. a strategy that involves setting M2 = M1). When A’s
first-period proposal bP1 is voted on, each member of M1 is pivotal. If she votes ‘no’, bP1 is
defeated; she receives the default payoff b0D in period 1, and (in expectation) receives (q/(n –
1))b0D in period 2. If, on the other hand, she votes ‘yes’, bP1 is enacted; she receives bjP1 in period
1, and b0D (with certainty) in period 2. Thus, the payoffs can be expressed as b0D + δ(q/(n – 1))b0D
from a ‘no’ vote, and bjP1 + δb0D from voting ‘yes’. The minimum bjP1 that will induce each j ∈
M1 to vote ‘yes’ is denoted x*, and is obtained by equating the payoffs from voting ‘yes’ and
‘no’; it can be characterized as follows:

9


 n − 1 − q 
x* = b0D 1 − δ 

 n − 1 

As (n – 1 – q)/(n – 1) > 0, δ > 0 and b0D > 0, it follows straightforwardly that:

(2)

Remark 1: x* < b0D
Thus, A can propose less than the default payoff in period 1 to each j ∈ M1 while still inducing
each to vote ‘yes’.
The ‘incremental budgeting’ strategies can be defined more formally as follows (where
j’s strategy of voting ‘yes’ to period-1 allocations greater than x* is denoted σjI):

σAI:

In period 1, choose at random15 a subset of J, denoted M1, where card (M1) = q, and
propose bjP1
= x*
=0
= R – qx*

if j ∈ M1
if j ∉ M1
if j = A

If bP1passes (i.e. bL1 = bP1), then, in period 2, propose bjP2
if j ∈ M1
= b0D
=0
if j ∉ M1
= R + I – qb0D if j = A
If bP1does not pass, then, in period 2, choose at random a subset of J, denoted M2, where
card M2 = q, and propose bjP2
if j ∈ M2
= b0D
=0
if j ∉ M2
= R + I – qb0D if j = A

σjI:

In period 1, if bjP1 ≥ x*, then vote ‘yes’; otherwise, vote ‘no’.
In period 2, if bjP2 ≥ b0D, then vote ‘yes’; otherwise, vote ‘no’.

It can be shown that the strategies defined above are mutual best responses; this will be termed
the ‘incremental budgeting’ equilibrium:

15

The random choice of the q legislators means that A is, in a sense, following a mixed strategy. More precisely, A’s
strategy involves the (random) choice of coalition members, followed by the proposal of a budget that includes
offers of allocations to these members. This formulation is preferable to one that characterizes A’s strategy as a
probabilistic offer to each j (i.e. A offers b0D to each j with probability (q/(n – 1))) because it avoids the possibility of
realizations of A’s strategy that lead to the defeat of A’s proposal in equilibrium. Myerson (1993) adopts the latter
approach, but in a very different context, with multicandidate elections and an infinite number of voters.
10

Proposition 1: Consider the 2-period budgeting game. There exist subgame perfect ‘incremental
budgeting’ equilibria, where A plays σAI and each j plays σjI. In an equilibrium of this type, A
chooses q j’s at random to form M1, and proposes x* for each j ∈ M1; bL1 = bP1. In period 2, A
proposes b0D for each j ∈ M1; bL2 = bP2.
Proof: To show that σAI and σjI are mutual best responses:
Suppose that A plays σAI. Consider j ∈ M1; deviating by voting ‘no’ in period 1 will lead
to the defeat of bP1 (as each j is pivotal) and lead to an expected payoff of x*. Thus, this
deviation does not raise j’s payoff. Deviating by voting ‘no’ in period 2 leads to the
default payoff b0D in period 2, which is identical to the equilibrium payoff in period 2;
thus, j cannot raise her payoff by deviating. For j ∉ M1, deviating by voting ‘yes’ in either
period clearly cannot raise her payoff above 0.
Suppose that each j plays σjI. If A deviates by offering bjP1 < x* to any j ∈ M1, bP1 will
fail, and A will receive a payoff of bAD in period 1, which is strictly less than the
equilibrium period-1 payoff R – qx* (recall Equation (1a) and A1, while q < (n – 1) by
assumption, and x* < b0D by Remark 1), while the period-2 payoff is unchanged.
Deviating by offering bjP1 > x* to any j ∈ M1 also makes A worse off. Similar arguments
hold for period 2. Moreover, note that A has no incentive to deviate by changing the
membership of the coalition across periods (i.e. setting M2 ≠ M1). Regardless of the
identity of the q legislators in M2, A’s payoff in period 2 is R + I - qb0D. Of course, there
is no incentive for A to expand the coalition to include more than q members. End of
Proof.
This incremental equilibrium is not unique, however. Indeed, there is a continuum of
equilibria. To see this, note that A’s strategy (with respect to the choice of M2) can be
characterized by a probability distribution over the elements of the set J, indicating the
probability that each j will be included in the period 2 coalition (e.g. assigning probability pj to j
being chosen, contingent on bP1 passing). Each probability distribution defines an allocation xj*
that makes j indifferent between voting ‘yes’ and ‘no’ in period 1. Consider a strategy for A that
involves choosing q j’s in period 1, and proposing xj* to each j ∈ M1; if bP1 passes, A includes
each of these j’s in M2 with probability pj. This strategy and a strategy for j that involves voting
‘yes’ in period 1 whenever bjP1 > xj* clearly constitute mutual best responses. There are,
however, an infinite number of possible probability distributions over the j’s; thus, there are an
infinite number of equilibria (note that the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 involves
setting pj = 1 for j ∈ M1 and pj = 0 for j ∉ M1).
In comparing the properties of the incremental budgeting equilibria in Proposition 1 with
those of the other types of equilibria, it is helpful to focus on an extreme case that will be labeled
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the ‘nonincremental budgeting’ equilibrium. This involves A randomizing completely over the
j’s (i.e. setting the pj’s equal) in period 2, even when bP1 passes. The ‘nonincremental’ strategies
(denoted σAN and σjN) can be defined as follows:

σAN:

In period 1, choose at random a subset of J, denoted M1, where card (M1) = q, and
propose bjP1
if j ∈ M1
= b0D
=0
if j ∉ M1
D
= R – qb0
if j = A
In period 2, choose at random a subset of J, denoted M2, where card (M2) = q, and
propose bjP2
if j ∈ M2
= b0D
=0
if j ∉ M2
= R + I – qb0D if j = A

σjN:

In each period i = 1, 2, if bjPi ≥ b0D, then vote ‘yes’; otherwise, vote ‘no’.

It can be shown that:
Proposition 2: Consider the 2-period budgeting game. There exist subgame perfect
‘nonincremental budgeting’ equilibria, where A plays σAN and each j plays σjN. In an equilibrium
of this type, A chooses q j’s at random to form M1, and proposes b0D for each j ∈ M1; bL1 = bP1. In
period 2, A chooses q j’s at random to form M2, and proposes b0D for each j ∈ M1; bL2 = bP2.
Proof: To show that σAN and σjN are mutual best responses:
Suppose that A plays σAN. Consider a j who is offered an allocation of b0D in either period.
Deviating by voting ‘no’ entails the proposal’s defeat, and leads to the default payoff b0D;
thus, j cannot raise her payoff by defecting when she is included in A’s coalition.
Similarly, a j who is offered 0 cannot raise her payoff by deviating and voting ‘yes’.
Suppose that each j plays σjN. If A deviates (in either period) by offering bjPi < b0D to any j
in the coalition, the proposal will be defeated; A will receive the default payoff b0D, rather
than the equilibrium payoff R – qb0D (period 1) or R + I – qb0D (period 2). Note that, by
Equation (1) and A1, and given that q < (n – 1) by assumption, it follows that R – qb0D >
b0D, and (as I ≥ 0), R + I – qb0D > b0D. Thus, A cannot raise her payoff by deviating in this
way. Deviating by proposing bjPi > b0D also leads to a strictly lower payoff. A also does
not have an incentive to deviate by changing the selection of M2 from the random process
specified in σAN: any coalition of q j’s leads to the same payoff in period 2 (of R + I –
qb0D), so the random choice of M2 is a best response. End of Proof.
This equilibrium replicates in each period the outcome of the 1-period game (discussed above).
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3.3) Comparing Incremental and Nonincremental Equilibria
A noteworthy feature of these different equilibria (in Propositions 1 and 2) is that they
lead to systematically different payoffs for A and the j’s. More precisely, let UAI(σAI, σjI) and
UAN(σAN, σjN) be A’s payoffs in the incremental and nonincremental equilibria, respectively.
Similarly, define UjI(σAI, σjI) and UjN(σAN, σjN) for j = 2, . . . , n as the expected payoff of each j
in the incremental and nonincremental equilibria. Then:
Proposition 3: UAI > UAN and UjI < UjN for j = 2, . . . , n. Moreover, UAI is the highest payoff that
A can obtain in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof: UAI(σAI, σjI) = (R – qx*) + δ(R + I – qb0D) and
UAN(σAN, σjN) = (R – qb0D) + δ(R + I – qb0D)
As x* < b0D (see Remark 1), it follows that UAI > UAN
UjI(σAI, σjI) = (q/(n – 1))(x* + δb0D)
UjN(σAN, σjN) = (1 + δ)(q/(n – 1))b0D
Again, from Remark 1, it follows that UjI < UjN for j = 2, . . . , n
Finally, recall the partially incremental equilibria, where there is some probability (< 1)
that j ∈ M1 is included in the period-2 coalition. Clearly, any reduction in this probability
below 1 requires that A propose a larger period-1 allocation xj* to compensate.
Consequently, A’s period-1 payoff must be lower than R – qx*; on the other hand, A’s
period-2 payoff is always R + I – qb0D. Thus, UAI is the highest payoff A can obtain in any
subgame perfect equilibrium. End of Proof.
The significance of this result is that the higher payoff received by A under incremental
budgeting may provide a rationale for why traditional or ‘classical’ budgeting was organized in
this fashion. More specifically, it suggests that those legislators with agenda setting power on
budgetary policy may wish to foster an incrementalist ethos in order to increase the payoffs they
receive from budget allocations.
3.4) Solution with Commitment
The analysis of the 2-period game above proceeded under the assumption that A cannot
make commitments in period 1 to allocate money in particular ways in period 2. However, it may
be the case that, in many real-world budgeting contexts, there exist institutional mechanisms that
enable A to make such a commitment (at least to some degree). This section analyzes the 2period model under the assumption that A can make the following commitment to legislator j
(j = 2, . . . , n):
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Definition 1 (‘Grandfathering’): If bjP1 = x, and bP1 is enacted (bL1 = bP1), then bjP2 ≥ x ∀j∈J
This amounts to a commitment to ‘grandfather’ budget allocations, contingent on the proposed
period-1 budget being enacted. Institutions that may enable A to commit to grandfathering
include budget baselines and procedural rules that preclude (or impose high transactions costs
on) revisiting past allocations (as discussed in Section 1).
The main result of this section is that, if A can commit to grandfathering, then the
nonincremental (and partially incremental) equilibria are eliminated:
Proposition 4: Consider the 2-period budgeting game, and assume that A can commit to
grandfathering budget allocations (as specified in Definition 1). Then, the only subgame perfect
equilibria involve incremental budgeting (i.e. the same equilibrium outcomes as when A plays
σAI and each j plays σjI).
Proof: Consider the subgame consisting of period 2, and suppose that bP1 has been enacted. A
will always choose M2 such that card (M2) = q. The cost incurred by A in passing the
period-2 budget can be expressed as:

qb0D +

∑b

P1
j
j∈M 1 and j∉M 2

(3)

i.e. A needs to allocate b0D to each of the q members of M2. In addition, if there are any
j’s who were part of M1 but are not included in M2, A must allocate each of these j’s her
period-1 allocation bjP1 in order to satisfy the commitment to grandfathering. Clearly, this
cost can be minimized by ensuring that there is no j ∈ M1 who is excluded from M2 (note
that this is feasible, as card (M1) = card (M2) = q). Thus, setting M2 = M1 is strictly
preferred by A to any alternative strategy (as it leads to a period-2 payoff of R + I – qb0D,
which is strictly higher than that resulting from any difference between M2 and M1).
Therefore, any subgame perfect equilibrium must involve M2 = M1; i.e. incremental
budgeting. Given this, A’s optimal period-1 strategy is to propose x* for each j ∈ M1 (as
in the strategy σAI). As shown in Proposition 1, each j’s best response is σjI; moreover,
any best response must involve the same action (i.e. voting ‘yes’) in period 1. Thus, the
equilibrium outcomes are those specified in Proposition 1. End of Proof.
Thus, if A has the ability to precommit to grandfathering period-1 allocations, incremental
budgeting represents the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (up to the choice of M1); in effect,
A can ensure that she receives the higher payoff associated with the incremental budgeting
outcome.
3.5) A Note on Credible Threats of Exclusion
In deriving the results above, it was assumed that, in the event that bP1 is defeated, A
simply randomizes over all legislators in choosing M2. If it is assumed that it is possible for A to
credibly make more specific threats to the members of M1 off the equilibrium path, then the
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results are strengthened. In particular, suppose that A can threaten to exclude as many members
of M1 who vote ‘No’ as possible from M2. Thus, if the q legislators in M1 vote ‘No’ in period 1,16
then, when building a period 2 coalition, A will turn first to the (n – 1 – q) legislators who were
not part of M1, recruiting only the other (2q – n + 1) from the members of M1. The probability
that a legislator who votes ‘No’ in period 1 is subsequently included in M2 is reduced to
(2q – n + 1)/q. The analog to x* under these circumstances, denoted x**, can be defined as:


 n − 1 − q 

x * * = b0D 1 − δ 
q




(4)

As (n – 1) > q, δ > 0 and b0D > 0 by assumption, it follows that (n – 1 – q)/(n – 1) < (n – 1 – q)/q,
and hence that:
Remark 2: x** < x*
That is, allowing A to make a credible out-of-equilibrium threat of exclusion from the period 2
coalition further lowers the period 1 allocation necessary to ensure passage of bP1, thereby
raising A’s payoff and reducing the expected payoff of each junior legislator.
An interesting special case occurs when the legislature operates under a simple majority
rule, so that q = (n – 1)/2. Then, it is possible for A to exclude every single member of M1 if she
votes ‘No’ in period 1, so the threat involves a zero probability of being in M2. In these
circumstances, x** = (1 – δ)b0D; intuitively, x** only needs to be sufficient to compensate for
discounting, as j ∈ M1 faces a choice between receiving b0D now and 0 next period (by voting
‘no’) or x** now and b0D next period (by voting ‘yes’).
3.6) A Note on Endogenous Default Payoffs
In the preceding analysis, it has been assumed (as discussed in Section 3.1) that the
default payoffs of legislators are exogenous: they are independent of the realized pattern of play
in thegame. As noted earlier, this rules out the case where bjD2 = bjL1 (i.e. legislator j’s period 2
default is her period 1 allocation). To see why this assumption may seem restrictive, suppose that
A is unable to commit to grandfathering (in the sense of Definition 1). Suppose further that A
offers some amount x (sufficient to induce a vote for the proposal) to q j’s in period 1. This
proposed allocation is enacted, by assumption. Then, in period 2, each j ∈ M1 has default payoff
16

It is assumed here that all the members of M1 vote ‘No’, given the assumption of symmetric behavior. If only
some of them vote ‘No’, then A’s threat to exclude is even more potent, as the probability of a legislator who voted
‘No’ being part of M2 can be reduced even further.
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x, while each j ∉ M1 has default payoff 0. Obviously, the latter will be the cheapest to buy, from
A’s point of view; thus, A will build a coalition M2 that contains as many j ∉ M1 as possible, and
each of these j’s will be offered an allocation of 0. Only as many j ∈ M1 as absolutely necessary
to ensure passage will be included in M2, with each of these j’s being offered x (in the special
case of a simple majority rule, no j ∈ M1 will be included in M2). This result would seem to be
the opposite of incremental budgeting – those legislators excluded from the period 1 coalition are
always included in period 2, while those in the period 1 coalition are only included in period 2 if
absolutely necessary.
However, if it is possible for A to comit to grandfathering (as defined above), then
incremental budgeting outcomes are possible, even when bjD2 = bjL1. To see this, consider a
simple example. Let n = 5, with L = {A, 2, 3, 4, 5}, q = 2 (i.e. a simple majority rule), and δ = 1.
Suppose that bjD1 = b0D (i.e. the first-period default is exogenous) and bjD2 = bjL1, and that M1 =
{2, 3}; in addition, suppose that (as in Section 3.5) A can credibly threaten to exclude j’s from
the period 2 coalition. In the absence of commitment to grandfathering, the equilibrium involves
nonincremental budgeting, with A offering b0D to 2 and 3 in period 1, and 0 to all j’s in period 2,
with M2 = {4, 5}; A’s payoff is 2R + I – 2 b0D. Now suppose that commitment to grandfathering
(in the sense of Definition 1) is possible. The equilibrium here involves A offering b0D/2 to 2 and
3 in each period. Of course, 4 and 5 are technically ‘included’ in M2, in that they are offered their
default of 0, and will vote ‘yes’; however, when there is at least a small ε cost of expanding the
coalition, the M1 = M2 feature of incrementalism will hold. This equilibrium gives A the same
payoff 2R + I – 2 b0D as that from nonincremental budgeting (where A does not precommit to
grandfathering, and changes the coalition from one period to the next). Thus, incremental
budgeting can be an optimal strategy for A when commitment to grandfathering is available,
even if the default payoffs of junior legislators are endogenous.
4) Incremental Budgeting with an Infinite Horizon
The basic model developed in Section 3 assumed that the budgeting game is played only
over two periods. This section extends this framework to budgeting with an infinite horizon; the
budgeting game (involving a budget proposal by A and a vote under a closed rule by the
legislature) is assumed to be repeated infinitely. The rationale for this assumption is that there is
uncertainty regarding how long A’s proposal power will last. Of course, as incremental
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budgeting outcomes can be sustained in the 2-period case (with and without commitment to
grandfathering), it is obvious that they can also be sustained in the infinitely repeated game. The
aim of this section is thus not to establish the existence of incremental outcomes, but rather to
analyze how the infinite horizon setting affects the gains to A from incremental budgeting. As in
Section (3.4), it is assumed here that A can credibly precommit to the grandfathering of budget
allocations. Incremental budgeting outcomes can of course be sustained even in the absence of
such commitment (though, in those circumstances, there are many other types of equilibria). This
section also returns to the assumption that A randomizes with equal probability over all j’s if a
proposal is defeated.
The (exogenous) stream of revenues available to the legislature for budgetary allocations
will be denoted by Rt, t = 1, 2, . . ., where Rt ≥ (n – 1)b0D + bAD ∀t.17 In the 2-period model, the
‘last-period’ factor in period 2 suggested that the default payoff for A in the last period should
differ from that in period 1. Here, however, the game to be played in the future is identical at
each point in time; thus, there is a common default payoff bAD. It is assumed that the infinite
sequence represented by the (discounted) revenue stream converges - i.e. that the discounted sum
of the Rt’s is finite:
∞

Condition 1: δ < 1 and R* ≡ ∑ δ t −1 Rt is finite
t =1

This condition is assumed to hold throughout the analysis in this section. The game in the
infinitely repeated case is a straightforward extension of that described in Section 3. In each
period, A proposes a feasible budget allocation,18 and the legislature votes the proposal up or
down, with the default allocations being given by b0D. The definition of ‘grandfathering’ is now
somewhat more general than in Section 3:
Definition 1′ (‘Grandfathering’): If bjPt = x, and bPk is enacted (∀k ≥ t), then bjP(k+1) ≥ x ∀j∈J
That is, if A offers x to j in period t, and the proposal passes, then A (credibly) commits to
offering at least x to j as long as the previous period’s proposal has passed. This is a
straightforward generalization of Definition 1.
17

Note that it is not necessary to impose the restriction that Rt+1 ≥ Rt ∀t (i.e. that the revenue stream is
nondecreasing) to derive the results below.
18
‘Feasibility’ here refers to the budget constraint. Note that, as in the previous analysis, a period-by-period
constraint is being assumed. However, the results would not change fundamentally if A were permitted to reallocate
revenue across different periods, as long as there are some constraints on borrowing (so that, for instance, A cannot
spend the entire revenue stream in t = 1, and allocate 0 thereafter).
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As before, the solution concept involves looking for subgame perfect Nash equilibria.19
The central result of this section is:
Proposition 5: Suppose that Condition 1 holds, and that precommitment to grandfathering is
possible; then, in every subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game,
(i)

A chooses M1 (consisting of q junior legislators) randomly in period 1

(ii)

∀t = 1, 2, . . ., A proposes bjPt
= γb0D if j ∈ M1
=0

if j ∉ M1

where

γ=

1− δ
δq
1−
n −1

(5)

(note that γ < 1 for any δ > 0), and bPt passes ∀t = 1, 2, . . .
(iii)

A’s equilibrium payoff (in present value terms) is

(n − 1)qb0D
n − 1 − δq
(which exceeds A’s default payoff bAD/(1 – δ))
R*−

(iv)

(6)

j’s expected payoff (in present value terms) is
qb0D/(n – 1 – δq)

(7)

Proof: (i) The MWC result from the 2-period model extends to this context, so M1 will consist of
q j’s; A will choose them randomly because the j’s are identical.
(ii) Let bjP1 = x ∀j ∈ M1. Consider period t. There are two relevant kinds of histories to
consider. Following histories in which bP(t-1) failed, the subgame following this history is
identical to the entire game from t = 1; thus, in period t, A will choose Mt randomly, and
offer bjPt = x ∀j ∈ Mt. Following histories in which bP(t-1) passed, note that there must
have been a continuous history of passage since period h, where 1 ≤ h ≤ t – 1. By
Definition 1′ above, it follows that A chose a coalition consisting of q j’s, Mh, in period h,
and that A offers bjPt = x ∀j ∈ Mh in period t. (Note that, in each case, it will be optimal
for A to set bjPt = 0 for j’s outside the coalition)
To characterize x: consider t = 1, or t > 1 following a history in which bP(t-1) failed. As
noted above, A will choose q j’s randomly to form Mt. Consider the choice faced by j ∈
19

In addition, an assumption of stationarity is made, requiring that behavior be identical in all subgames that are
structurally essentially identical. A complication here is that the stage games may not be precisely identical, because
the future revenue stream may differ in different periods. However, this does not fundamentally affect the results, as
Condition 1 ensures that, at any point in time, the future revenue stream converges.
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Mt: voting ‘yes’ will lead (given the definition of incrementalism) to a payoff of x(1 + δ +
δ2 + . . .) = x/(1 - δ). Voting ‘no’ leads to a payoff of b0D in period t, and to a (q/(n - 1))
probability of being included in next period’s coalition – i.e. to a payoff of b0D + (q/(n 1))x(δ + δ2 + . . .) = b0D + (q/(n – 1))(δ/(1 – δ))x. Thus, A must choose x so as to just
induce j to vote ‘yes’:
x/(1 - δ) = b0D + xqδ/((n - 1)(1 - δ))
Rearranging yields x = γb0D.
An alternative approach is to assume that deviation by j involves voting ‘no’ whenever
the opportunity arises (i.e. ‘no’ in period t, ‘no’ in period (t + 1) if j is in Mt+1, which
happens with probability (q/(n - 1)), and so on). This leads to the same expression for x.
Given the above proposal, each j ∈ Mt will vote ‘yes’ ∀t (recall that j votes ‘yes’ when
indifferent); thus, bPt passes ∀t = 1, 2, . . .
To establish subgame perfection: consider the subgame beginning after period t. There
are two types of histories to consider:
–

after a history in which bPt passes, note that A is constrained by Definition 1′. Using
the strategies specified above, A will offer each j ∈ Mh (where h = 1 if A’s proposals
have all passed, or 1 < h < t if one or more previous proposals have failed (where h 1 is the last period where a proposal failed)) x = γb0D in period t and each subsequent
period, and each j ∈ Mh will vote ‘yes’ each period; from the reasoning above, this
constitutes a Nash equilibrium

–

after a history in which bPt fails, A will choose Mt+1 randomly, and offer x = γb0D to
each j ∈ Mt+1 in period t and each subsequent period, and each j ∈ Mt+1 will vote
‘yes’ each period; from the reasoning above, this also constitutes a Nash equilibrium

This reasoning applies for each t; thus, the strategies specified in the Proposition are a
Nash equilibrium in every subgame. This establishes subgame perfection. (Note that
there are many subgame-perfect equilibria, corresponding to different choices of M1;
however, all have the characteristics specified in the Proposition).
(iii) Given the equilibrium strategies, A allocates, in present value terms, γb0D(1 + δ + δ2
+ . . .) to each of the q members of the coalition M1. A also allocates the remainder of the
(finite) revenue stream R* to her own district; thus, her aggregate allocation is
R* – γb0D(1 + δ + δ2 + . . .)
in present value terms. Substituting in the expression for γ and simplifying gives the
result.
To show that A’s payoff exceeds her default payoff, note that the latter involves receiving
bAD each period (a present value of bAD/(1 – δ)). Consider the smallest revenue stream
that is consistent with the assumptions of the model, namely, Rt = (n – 1)b0D + bAD ∀t;
then, R* = ((n – 1)b0D + bAD)/(1 – δ), and A’s payoff can be expressed as:
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 n − 1 − δq − (1 − δ ) 
bAD
+ ( n − 1)b0D 
(8)

1− δ
 (1 − δ )( n − 1 − δq ) 
Note that the expression in brackets is greater than 0, so that A’s payoff exceeds the
default payoff bAD/(1 – δ). As this holds for the minimum possible revenue stream, it
must also hold for any (finite) revenue stream. Thus, A always prefers to play the strategy
specified in the proposition, rather than receive the default payoff each period.
(iv) Each j has a q/(n - 1) probability of being included in M1. If so, she receives a stream
of payoffs γb0D(1 + δ + δ2 + . . .) with present value γb0D/(1 – δ); otherwise, she receives
0 each period. Thus, her expected payoff, in present value terms, is
qγb0D/[(n – 1)(1 – δ)]
Substituting in the expression for γ and simplifying yields the result. End of Proof.
The result above generalizes Proposition 4 to the case where the budgeting game is repeated
infinitely. It is noteworthy that this extension to an infinitely repeated game reinforces the result
from the 2-period game. Specifically, A can now offer a lower per-period allocation (γb0D) to
each member of the winning coalition than the x* defined in Equation (2) above, and still ensure
passage of the budget:
Remark 3: γb0D < x*
Proof: From Proposition 5(ii), γb0D can be expressed as:

γb0D =

(1 − δ )( n − 1) 2
( n − 1)( n − 1 − δq)

and x* (from Equation (2)) can be expressed as:

x* =

( n − 1 − δq )[( n − 1)(1 − δ ) + δq]
( n − 1)( n − 1 − δq )

The numerator of this expression can be simplified as follows:
(1 – δ)(n – 1)2 – δq(1 – δ)(n – 1) + δq(n – 1) – δ2q2
= (1 – δ)(n – 1)2 + δ2q(n – 1 – q)
As q < n – 1, q > 0, and δ > 0 by assumption, it follows that γb0D < x*. End of Proof.
This result suggests that A’s gains from incremental budgeting are even greater in the infinitely
repeated context than in the simple 2-period setting of Section 3. Intuitively, the consequences
for j of being excluded from the coalition are more severe when the time horizon involved is
longer, so those included in the coalition will be willing to accept a lower per-period payoff.
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Moreover, there is no final period in which each coalition member must be allocated her default
payoff. Note that, because it is not necessary to impose a restriction that the revenue stream is
nondecreasing, another significant implication is that a declining revenue stream does not, by
itself, undermine the budget proposer’s incentive to institute incrementalism.
The expression for γ in Proposition 5(ii) also yields some (potentially) testable
implications regarding how A’s benefits from incrementalism change in response to the model’s
parameters. In particular, the higher is δ, the lower is γ; the more patient are the legislators, the
greater is the benefit to A of incremental budgeting. This is because more patient j’s will weight
the loss from their possible noninclusion in future coalitions more heavily, and hence will be
more willing to accept a lower per-period allocation in exchange for the certainty of inclusion. In
addition, the larger is the number of votes required for passage (i.e. the higher is q relative to n),
the higher is γ. Thus, supermajority requirements for budgetary bills will, ceteris paribus, tend to
lower the benefits to A from incrementalism, because they reduce the risk to j’s of being
excluded from future coalitions (and, hence, make j’s less willing to accept low per-period
allocations).
Finally, it should be emphasized that, for reasonable parameter values, the magnitude of
the effect in Proposition 5 is quite substantial. That is, the difference between the γb0D allocated
to each coalition member each period and the default payoff b0D is large. For example, consider
the following values: n = 101, q = 60 (so that 61 votes are required for passage), and δ = 0.9.
Then, γb0D = (10/46)b0D ≈ 0.22b0D. Thus, for these (reasonable) parameter values, the allocation
that is sufficient to attract the support of each coalition member is only approximately a fifth of
the default allocation that the member would receive.
[Table 1 about here]

Table 1 shows the values of γ (the fraction of the default payoff required to induce a
coalition member to vote ‘yes’) that result from various values of n, (q + 1), and δ. In addition to
the generally low values of γ, the table illustrates how γ changes in response to the parameters.
As δ rises (i.e. legislators become more patient), γ falls, while, as δ decreases, γ rises. As q
increases relative to n (which makes it less likely that those j’s who vote ‘no’ can be excluded
from the future coalition), γ rises. Conversely, as q decreases relative to n, γ falls. Overall, the
calculations suggest that the magnitude of the effect of incremental budgeting is substantial.
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5) Incremental Budgeting with Heterogeneous Legislators

The analysis so far has relied on the assumption that the junior legislators are ex ante
identical in all respects. This section returns to the simple 2-period game of Section 3, and
considers the situation where legislators differ (strictly) in terms of the default payoffs they
receive if A’s proposal is defeated. Specifically, it is assumed that j’s default payoff is bjD, where,
without loss of generality, the j’s are numbered such that b2D < b3D < b4D . . . < bnD (they will be
referred to for convenience as j2, j3, . . . jn). As before, revenue is assumed to be sufficient to
cover the aggregate default payoffs, so that:
n

R ≥ ∑ b Dj

(9)

j= A

Then, one can define:
Definition 2: The cheapest MWC, denoted MC, consists of q junior legislators {2, 3, . . . , (q +

1)} (so that ΣbjD is minimized).
Initially, consider the 2-period game with no precommitment to grandfathering. In the
subgame consisting of period 2, it is immediately apparent that the equilibrium proposal must
involve bjP2
= bjD

if j ∈ MC

=0

if j ∉ MC

In period 1, this equilibrium proposal is anticipated, so each j ∈ MC kows that she has probability
1 of being included in the period-2 coalition; consequently, no j ∈ MC will accept a proposal that
allocates her less than her default bjD. Conversely, each j ∉ MC knows that she has probability 0
of being included in the period-2 coalition, and will hence not accept a proposal that allocates her
less than her default bjD. Clearly, it will be cheapest for A to build a coalition M1 = MC; thus, the
period-1 proposal will be identical to the period-2 proposal specified above. A’s equilibrium
payoff is:20
q +1

(1 + δ ) R + δI − (1 + δ )∑ b Dj

(10)

j =2

20

Note that, from Eq. (9) above, this equilibrium payoff always exceeds A’s default payoff of receiving bAD each
period (given that I ≥ 0 and q + 1 < n).
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Thus, without commitment to grandfathering, A builds the cheapest coalition MC each
period. The issue considered here is whether, when precommitment to grandfathering is
available, A can achieve a higher payoff. The circumstances in which this is possible can perhaps
best be introduced through a very simple example. Suppose that n = 5, and that the j’s have the
following default payoffs:
b2D = 9; b3D = 10; b4D = 11; b5D = 12
Assume a simple majority rule, so that q + 1 = 3 (i.e. A needs 2 coalition partners for the passage
of the budget), and that δ = 1. Let CC be the cost to A of a strategy that involves building MC each
period. As MC = {j2, j3}, it follows that CC = 38. Note that, without commitment, this is A’s
equilibrium cost (yielding equilibrium payoff 2R + I – 38).
Suppose that A has the ability to precommit to grandfathering, and seeks to build a
coalition consisting of j4 and j5. Thus, A proposes some positive allocation to each of j4 and j5 in
period 1. If one of them votes ‘no’ and bP1 fails, then A will minimize period-2 costs by
proposing bP2 = (⋅, 9, 10, 0, 0).21 The issue, then, is what allocations will induce j4 and j5 to vote
‘yes’ in period 1. Suppose that A proposes b5P1 = 1; then, j5 will anticipate that, in period 2, it will
be cheaper for A to replace her with j2, despite the fact that A will still have to allocate b5P2 = 1 to
satisfy the grandfathering commitment. Thus, j5 will vote ‘no’. By this reasoning, it is clear that a
proposal b5P1 = 3 will just induce j5 to vote ‘yes’, as it eliminates the incentive for A to drop j5
from the period-2 coalition. Similarly, b4P1 = 2 will induce j4 to vote ‘yes’ in period 1 (note that,
as we are considering deviations from a candidate equilibrium one at a time, it is the difference
between bjD and the default payoff of the cheapest alternative j that matters here). If A proposes
bP1 = (⋅, 0, 0, 2, 3) and bP2 = (⋅, 0, 0, 11, 12), each proposal will pass, and A incurs a total cost of

28 (i.e. a payoff of 2R + I – 28). Clearly, A can benefit from the ability to precommit.
Now suppose that q + 1 = 4, so that A needs 3 coalition partners. Without commitment,
the coalition would consist each period of MC = {j2, j3, j4}, with CC = 60. Assume that A can
precommit. Note that A can no longer recruit the entire coalition from outside MC. Instead, A will
build a coalition of all j’s outside MC, together with as many j’s (specifically, the cheapest ones)
from MC as required. The j whose default determines how much each j ∉ MC must be paid in

21

This notation omits A’s own allocation for convenience, to focus on the proposals for the j’s.
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period 1 is now the cheapest j ∈ MC outside A’s coalition. Thus, suppose A proposes bP1 = (⋅, 9,
10, 0, 1) and bP2 = (⋅, 9, 10, 0, 12); then, each proposal will pass, and A’s cost will be 51.
To generalize from these examples, return to the more abstract formulation of the
situation at the beginning of this section. Recall that the j’s are numbered such that b2D < b3D < b4D
. . . < bnD, and that MC = {j2, j3, . . . , jq+1}, where card MC = q. Legislators {jq+2, jq+3, . . . , jn} are
outside MC, with card J ∼ MC = n – q – 1. In the examples above, a strategy of choosing MC each
period was contrasted with one that used A’s precommitment capacity to lower the cost of the
coalition. Strictly speaking, the outcomes associated with both these strategies appear
‘incremental’ (in the sense that the same coalition is maintained from period 1 to period 2).
However, choosing MC each period is only incidentally incremental (in that it is simply
equivalent to period-by-period optimization by A), whereas the other strategy relies crucially on
the grandfathering commitment. Thus, the latter will be labeled an ‘incremental’ strategy in the
analysis to follow, and the cost associated with adopting this strategy will be denoted by CI.
The incremental strategy for A involves including each j ∈ J ∼ MC in the coalition. This
secures the support of (n – q – 1) legislators, leaving a shortfall of (2q + 1 – n); this is made up
by also including {j2, j3, . . . , j2q+2-n} in the coalition. The cost of securing passage of each
period’s budget using this strategy is:
C I = (1 + δ )

2q + 2−n

∑ b Dj +
j=2

n

∑

j=q+2

( b Dj − b 2Dq + 3 − n ) + δ

n

∑b

j=q+2

D
j

(11)

whereas the cost of simply choosing MC each period is:
C

C

q +1

= (1 + δ ) ∑ b Dj

(12)

j=2

It can be shown that:
Proposition 6: Consider the 2-period budgeting game with commitment, and suppose that
legislators have strictly heterogeneous default payoffs, such that b2D < b3D < b4D . . . < bnD. Then,
if (bnD – b2D) > 0 is sufficiently small, CI < CC (i.e. the cost to A of an incremental strategy is
lower than that of choosing MC each period).
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Proof: Define ε3, ε4, . . ., εn, where εj > 0 ∀j = 3, . . ., n and εj+1 > εj ∀j = 3, . . ., n – 1, such that:

bjD = b2D + εj

(13)

Then, it is possible to express CI and CC as:
C I = (1 + δ )( 2 q + 1 − n ) b 2D + (1 + δ )
+

n

∑

j=q+2

2q + 2−n

∑ε
j=2

j

ε j − ( n − q − 1)ε 2 q + 3 − n + δ ( n − q − 1) b qD+ 2 + δ

n

∑ε

j=q+2

j

(14)

Note that:
lim C I = q + (1 + δ )q + 1 − n

ε j → 0 ∀j

and
lim C C = (1 + δ )q

ε j → 0 ∀j

q +1

C C = (1 + δ ) qb 2D + (1 + δ ) ∑ ε
j=2

(15)

j

Recall that q < n – 1. Thus, when εj = 0 ∀j = 3, . . ., n, CI < CC. Note that this is a strict
inequality, Thus, there must exist a sequence of sufficiently small εj’s, where εj > 0
∀j = 3, . . ., n (and hence (bnD – b2D) > 0) for which CI < CC. End of Proof.
This result shows that, if the heterogeneity among j’s is not too great, then an incremental
strategy will be optimal for A. To see the intuition for why this does not hold more generally,
recall the simple example above, with n = 5, q + 1 = 3, and δ = 1. Suppose that the default
payoffs are:
b2D = 1; b3D = 2; b4D = 20; b5D = 21
To secure passage, A would have to propose bP1 = (⋅, 0, 0, 19, 20) and bP2 = (⋅, 0, 0, 20, 21),
entailing a cost of CI = 80, whereas CC = 6. Clearly, if the legislators are sufficiently
heterogeneous, A cannot gain by adopting an incremental strategy. However, the general lesson
of this section is that, even when there is some heterogeneity among the j’s, there exist
circumstances in which incrementalism is optimal.
6) Conclusion, and Possible Extensions

This paper has developed a formal analysis of the concept of incremental budgeting,
linking the substantive concerns of public budgeting scholars with the theoretical approach of the
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rational choice tradition. A simple 2-period model was presented in Section 3, using a legislative
bargaining framework in which an exogenously chosen agenda setter proposes budget
allocations for each period. It was shown that the agenda setter can lower the cost of building a
winning coalition, and thereby increase her payoff, through the use of incremental budgeting. In
Section 4, the model was extended to an infinitely repeated context, and it was shown that the
basic result is reinforced in this setting. Moreover, calculations using reasonable values of the
model’s parameters suggest that the magnitude of the effect is quite large. Another significant
implication is that a declining revenue stream does not, by itself, undermine the budget
proposer’s incentive to institute incrementalist practices. A further extension in Section 5 showed
that incrementalism can be optimal for the agenda setter, even when there is some heterogeneity
among the other legislators.
These results show that incrementalist budgeting practices can be explained in terms of
the incentives of budget proposers to minimize the costs of building winning coalitions (and
thereby maximize their payoffs). This provides an alternative perspective to Wildavsky’s focus
on cognitive limitations and the reduction of conflict. While this paper has shown that significant
insights can be gained by analyzing public budgeting issues within a legislative bargaining
framework, a number of further extensions have been left for future research. For instance, this
paper follows the standard legislative bargaining approach and assumes that revenues are
exogenous. However, it would be of interest to relax this assumption, and to examine the
consequences of incrementalism for the aggregate size of the budget.22 Another issue that could
be explored is whether a legislature that is choosing its institutional structure by majority vote
would decide to permit institutions and rules that support incrementalism.23
It should also be noted that the model in Section 4 gives rise to a number of (potentially)
testable predictions (illustrated numerically in Table 1). In particular, the higher is q in relation to
n, the less incentive exists for incremental budgeting; thus, supermajority requirements that
reduce A’s ability to exclude j’s from the coalition will tend to decrease the payoff from
incrementalism. In addition, the more patient are the legislators (i.e. the higher is δ), the greater
22

Tohamy (2000) examines Wagner’s Law (of growth in government size) in the light of budgetary incrementalism.
Recall that A’s allocations are higher and each j’s allocations are lower under incrementalism. This paper uses
linear payoffs (an assumption that is innocuous here, as the results would generally be reinforced if payoffs were
concave). If A is chosen randomly before the first period, each legislator, voting in a prior organizational stage,
would be indifferent between incremental and nonincremental budgeting (as A’s gains are offset by the losses to the
j’s). However, this would not be true with concave payoffs, so this issue merits further exploration.
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the incentives for incremental budgeting. It would be an interesting exercise to confront these
predictions with the available data. Other possible topics to explore include the impact of term
limits on the ability to sustain coalitions over time, and the role of incrementalism in facilitating
logrolling among legislators and among legislative committees.
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Fig. 1: Timing of One Period of the Budgeting Game
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Table 1: The Magnitude of the Effect of Incremental Budgeting on γ
n
101
101
101
101
201
435

q+1
61
61
61
81
101
218

δ

γ (to 2 d.p.)

0.9
0.99
0.75
0.9
0.9
0.9

0.22
0.02
0.45
0.36
0.18
0.18
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